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CHOOSING JUSTICE
HOWARD C. ANAWALT*
The predominant view in the United States today is that the
Supreme Court makes basic social choices for the nation. Further-
more, that view is that the choices are made on the basis of a lib-
eral-conservative dichotomy. The view of the Court as basic pol-
icy-maker is continually nurtured by journalists, influential legal
scholars, and professional politicians. As is usually the case, the
accepted view of power reflects the actual distribution of power.
In the case of Supreme Court agenda power, I believe the popular
view has created the reality, rather than merely mirroring it.
The Supreme Court and other federal courts determine policy
in areas of great importance: freedom of speech, the scope of free
exercise of religion, access to print and electronic media, protec-
tion of reputation, rights of personal intimacy, the right to refuse
medical treatment, access to new technologies, antitrust policies,
distribution of economic and social opportunities, and the capacity
of communities to identify and nurture values. This list is not
complete, but it certainly demonstrates an enormous scope of ju-
dicial power.
Federal courts are a strange kind of institution to wield such
power in a democracy. Of the three branches they are the least
democratic. The judges and Justices are not elected. They serve
for life. They operate within an order of strict authority and hier-
archy. Courts enforce tight traditional decorum, and do so
through the personal decisions of the presiding judge and his or
her power of contempt. The agenda in any federal courtroom is
tightly confined by rules of evidence, presumptions, and detailed
procedural requirements. A five-to-four Supreme Court decision
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. B.A. 1960, Stanford University; J.D. 1964,
University of California (Boalt Hall). Professor Anawalt has taught, lectured, and written
on constitutional law since 1968. He teaches and practices law in high-technology-related
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ularly wants to remember Professor Russell W. Galloway, Jr., his valued and trusted col-
league who died shortly after the completion of this essay.
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that overturns an act of Congress or a long line of lower court
precedents binds all, but it does so not because the majority is
right, but because the Court is "supreme" and final.
Congress and the presidency share some of these attributes.
Both of these branches surround themselves with power and au-
thority. Both are somewhat removed from the people. Neverthe-
less, both of these institutions are subject to election and are in-
tended to be the focal point of political influence. Members of the
House and the Senate do make contact with their constituents and
listen to their opinions on matters of policy. However, basic
norms of judicial procedure bar the courts from engaging in any
kind of equivalent interplay.
"We the people" are in a pickle. The Justices of the Supreme
Court set our agenda, but we cannot pick them. We cannot even
get rid of them once they are on the Court.' If the people are
stuck with Justices who fall neatly on one or the other side of a
liberal-conservative party line, then there is bound to be the kind
of political frenzy that we have seen in recent nomination
hearings.
I. EXAMINING A NOMINEE'S PHILOSOPHY
The Senate should examine such matters as the nominee's back-
ground, candor, temperament, competence, and compassion. The
Senators also need to gain an understanding of the nominee's rea-
soning processes including such attributes as patience, experience,
logic, and knowledge of the law.
In two recent nomination hearings, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee attempted to delve into the nominee's constitutional philos-
ophy or constitutional politics.
The Senators grilled Judge Bork intensely on his judicial philos-
ophy. They pressed him to explain his understanding of the Con-
stitution and to explain and justify his philosophy or attitudes con-
cerning its interpretation. Judge Bork entered into the give and
take with gusto. The American public learned a great deal about
the Constitution during those hearings, but the hearings also
No one, I think, would argue that the impeachment power is an ample means of re-
stricting judicial agenda setting.
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proved to be the undoing of the nominee.
One practical lesson of the Bork nomination is for nominees to
keep a low profile. Justices Souter and Kennedy managed to do
just that and were easily confirmed. For whatever reasons, the
Senators scarcely penetrated the veneer of the nominees' knowl-
edge of precedents and current Supreme Court formulas or con-
stitutional "tests."
A number of the Senators attempted to draw Justice Thomas
out on issues of constitutional philosophy, but they were less suc-
cessful than in the case of Judge Bork. Justice Thomas was
pressed for his positions on "natural law," affirmative action, and
Roe v. Wade.2 He gave careful but bland responses on the first two
matters and declined to get into the abortion issue.
Should the Senators probe the constitutional or political philos-
ophy of nominees? I think they should. They should make this
inquiry in order to rate the qualities of reason, patience, inquiry
and articulation presented by the nominee's responses. It is also
appropriate for Senators to consider the general philosophy of the
nominee. For example, is he or she inclined toward expanding im-
plied rights under the Constitution?
At the same time, it is essential that Senators resist voting the
nominee up or down on the basis of his or her position on a par-
ticular issue. The key attitude for Senators to adopt is to take the
full range of qualities into consideration, rather than insist on
some "party line" set of beliefs. It is difficult to adhere to this
approach, but not more difficult than it is to retain an open mind
when one is sitting as a judge. Some Senators will discipline them-
selves to an approach that is free from a party line, while others
will be largely influenced by ideology, partisanship, or personal
likes and dislikes when they cast their votes. No system or set of
rules can assure that Senators will follow a non-ideological stan-
dard. Nevertheless, there is reason to expect that such a general
standard will carry great weight in influencing their votes.3
Proponents and opponents of Bork and Thomas waged media
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 Many Senators currently follow a general standard that they should "vote for the Pres-
ident's pick," unless they find compelling reasons to depart from it. That is precisely the
type of standard that should be left well behind us in the future.
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and public opinion campaigns for and against the nominees. As I
recall, some aspects of these campaigns were troubling in that
they seemed to oversimplify or distort the views or records of the
nominees. Distortion is particularly disturbing in the case of Su-
preme Court nominations, because it represents a strain of anti-
intellectualism or irrationality that runs directly against the funda-
mental rationality that is expected of the Supreme Court.4 The
primary antidote to public relations distortion with regard to
nominations is thoughtful sifting by Senators.'
II. THE GENUINELY POLITICAL ROLE OF THE COURT
Now, I will turn my attention to a critique of the Court's role
and some suggestions for reform.
The Supreme Court plays a political or policy-making role, but
that role should be a limited one. Some of the choices the Court
makes should be basic ones, but those choices should be confined
to norms that are fairly clearly to be derived from statutes or
from the Constitution itself-its terms, its structure, and its his-
tory.' This is a traditional view of the Court's role, and follows
from notions expressed in the Federalist papers and Marbury v.
Madison.7 As the Supreme Court has said, it should avoid acting as
a "super-legislature."8
I believe it is important to restrict the role of the Court, be-
cause I am convinced that the civil order a people live under is
approximately as good or effective as the people themselves are.
The social order and values reflect the maturity of the people.
The trouble with having a single small court prescribe major solu-
tions for a people is that the solutions are imposed from above, or
4 This is one of the amazing contradictions in the public attitudes towards the Justices:
they are expected to make ultimate political choices, yet be above politics!
5 A serious defect of the nomination process is the fact that the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee has been composed of all white males. This points to a serious institutional defect in
the Senate itself.
I There has been a great deal of writing on this subject. For some very interesting arti-
cles see Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703
(1975): Sanford Levinson, Law As Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982); Frederick
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV- 399 (1985).
5 U.S. 137, 173-78 (1803); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison); Id. No. 78
(Alexander Hamilton).
8 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
Vol. 7: 49, 1991
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from "out there" somewhere, rather than through the growth of
the entire nation's understanding and experience. This leads me
to conclude that major choices for the people should stem from
themselves and from representative bodies that honestly reflect
their views.'
Some basic policy-making roles are assigned to the Court by the
Constitution. One example is the Court's role in restraining states
from burdening interstate commerce. Another example is the un-
doubted role of the Court to set aside state laws that conflict with
federal laws."0 Policy-making is also assigned to the Court by cer-
tain statutes, as is the case with the federal antitrust laws.
The Court faces its most difficult policy choices when it inter-
prets or implies the existence of constitutional rights. When the
Court faces a question of interpretation of a norm set forth in the
Constitution, for example freedom of speech, its task is fairly
straightforward. The Court must debate and determine what the
norm means in the given instance, but the existence of the norm
is not in doubt."
The more difficult task is the matter of implying or creating
new rights such as privacy, abortion, control of medical care, the
right to vote, and others. It is proper for the Court to be active in
these areas and indeed to establish rights that are, in a real sense,
new to the Constitution. Nevertheless, the root or grounding of
the right must be firmly based in the Constitution, its structure, or
its history. Otherwise, the Court has indeed strayed beyond its
traditional function. More importantly, it strays beyond a healthy
role, because it imposes basic norms on people who have not acted
to create the norms for themselves. The Constitution acts as a
very deep keel of a ship, to keep our people on the general course
which the people themselves have chosen. 2 Ultimately it is the
people who must choose justice.
' There are major deficiencies in the constituency of our representative bodies. These
problems stem in large part from the influence of money and its impact on mass media.
0 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
The problem is more difficult when two norms collide, for example, when speech and
fair trial norms conflict.
" This is reflected in the very first words of the Constitution: "We the People of the
United States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America." U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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I have many colleagues, friends, and students who strongly disa-
gree with these views about a limited role for the Supreme Court.
In some instances they want or expect more from the Court than
what these views allow. They expect more justice and believe, ap-
parently, that justice must come from the Court. I would like
these friends and colleagues to consider some additional problems
that attend giving too much power to the courts.
The Supreme Court did create a right of a woman to choose
whether to continue a pregnancy, but its decisions have never as-
sured that right to the poor.1" The Supreme Court has helped
create magnificent strides in equality for all peoples, but it was
federal legislation that achieved the largest practical results in de-
segregating schools. Reduction of discrimination in private em-
ployment has been achieved entirely by statute. Reliance on judi-
cial agenda setting cannot produce broad effective action on an
array of general social problems.14
Another problem with too much reliance on the Justices is a
genuine misperception of what such dependence means as a mat-
ter of practical politics and decision making. If the Supreme Court
does sit as a "super-legislature," then policy-making will actually
be taken from legislatures and placed in the hands of the federal
district court and circuit court judges and their state court col-
leagues. The Supreme Court simply cannot get to any but a small
fraction of the policy-making cases of this nation. Secondly, gov-
ernment by judiciary means many basic rules will be made in a
process governed by very confining procedures and rules of evi-
dence that prevail in an adversary process. Passionate debates and
public concerns will be ruled out in this process. Furthermore, it
takes a great deal of money to bring cases through the courts
today.
" Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-74 (1977). No consistent majority of the Supreme
Court has ever expressed the view that it is a generally permissible role for the Court to
dictate general policies on how public money should be spent.
" The Courts did not create the mechanism of the New Deal. At most the Supreme
Court stepped out of the way of the political forces that sought certain changes and re-
forms. The Court will be equally incapable of addressing the haunting problems of our
nation today-a growing rich-poor gap, eroding education, ballooning health care costs, a
penchant to complain about other peoples (currently the Japanese), excessive use of mili-
tary force in foreign relations, the serious deterioration of cities, etc.
Vol. 7: 49, 1991
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. My first suggestion for reform in choosing a Justice is that our
electorate and its representatives end their "Oblomovism '" 16 and
take a more active role. Rather than worry about one form or
another of "judicial activism," we should seek more progressive
legislative and voter activism.
III. A FALSE DICHOTOMY
Popular criticism of what the Supreme Court does is essential. It
is also true that we need some broad labels and abstractions in our
political and Supreme Court commentaries. However, the idea
that the Justices articulate decisions that neatly divide along a
"liberal-conservative" line is, I believe, false. It is probably true
the individual Justices' preferences start from political beliefs that
might be labeled liberal or conservative. However, the Justices'
instincts or starting preferences must come into contact with ac-
tual constitutional premises. For example, whatever the liberalism
or conservatism of a Justice, he or she would be bound to admit
that the First Amendment must somehow restrain Congress from
wholesale prohibition of the circulation of newspapers.
The most important weakness of the liberal-conservative dichot-
omy is that it conceals rather than illuminates what choices the
judges are actually making. "Conservative" probably has some
core meanings-preserving existing institutions, slow change,
honor of tradition, and emphasis on property rights-things of
this tenor. "Liberal", however, is used today to encompass widely
disparate and contradictory philosophies about the social order.
Some people praise government promotion of affirmative action
as "liberal," and condemn government actions that help tradi-
tional family relations because the actions are "conservative."
Whether a local governmental project is called liberal or conserva-
tive is likely to depend on whether it is labeled "community ac-
tion" or "local control." What really lies at the heart of policy-
making on affirmative action, family, and community development
is what human needs are served. The use of these labels has ob-
scured American political thinking. In place of thoughtful analy-
" Oblomov was the main figure of Ivan Alexandrovich Goncharov's novel Oblomov. He
solved most problems by ignoring them and slept his way through most of the novel.
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sis, our journalism and political debate is too often mired in a dis-
cussion that summarizes various options under one of these two
ill-defined rubrics.
Therefore, my second suggestion for improving our choice of a
Justice is a plea that commentators and politicians express more
thoughtful analyses of issues and rely less on such broad labels as
"liberal" and "conservative.' 6
IV. LIMITED TERMS FOR JUSTICES
I would like now to explore two specific means of improving the
genuinely political role of the Supreme Court. These are ideas
that I believe deserve very serious and immediate consideration.
First of all, the terms of the Justices should be limited to a sub-
stantial number of years, rather than be appointments for life. 7
Life tenure is intended to serve the purpose of removing the Jus-
tices from political influence by making them secure in office.
This purpose is most clearly seen in the assurance of economic
security provided by Article III's provision that the judges' com-
pensation shall not be diminished while they continue in office.
The bulwark against political influence was probably intended to
serve the norm of independence of the judiciary, that is, that
judges as judicial decision makers ought not to be tampered with
by other branches.1 8
Judicial independence can be amply assured by a substantial,
fixed term of office. The term should be reasonably long in order
to allow the Justice to learn his or her role and to develop and
I cannot help but wonder-how will this suggestion be labeled?
Perhaps the terms of other federal judges should be similarly limited as well, but that
poses somewhat different questions, so I would like to leave it aside just now. I currently
believe that this reform should be adopted, but at this point the critical thing is that the
matter should be promptly and fully examined by the Congress.
" "Independence of the judiciary" means that courts should be free from external gov-
ernmental influences when they decide cases. It is a norm intended to assure people that
they will have a "day in court" where their cases are decided in accordance with the law
and facts. Independence of the judiciary is extremely important in our constitutional sys-
tem. It appears to be guaranteed by the concept of "separation of powers." See United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974); Chandler v. Judicial Council, 382 U.S. 1003,
1005-06 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147-48 (1872).
"Judicial review" is a distinct concept that refers to the accepted authority of courts
(especially federal courts) to review the acts of other entities, especially the validity of
legislation.
56
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express some continuity of thought. Also, I believe that a short
term would tend to undermine the actual independence of the
Justices. If a person is ever appointed to the Supreme Court, he or
she has reached the pinnacle of the profession. Fifteen to eighteen
years of service on the Court leaves the person with a very valua-
ble basis from which to launch into many successor lines of work
in our culture. I do not think it necessary to belabor the point
that an unimpeached Justice has the ability to fare very well in our
society when a term is over.
A limited term removes one of the bigger fears of politics on
the Supreme Court-that the brand of politics of the Court can-
not be changed by normal processes. One of the biggest hues and
cries of Clarence Thomas's opponents was that he might sit for
forty years on the Court. A reasonable term will provide a normal
rotation of persons and views on the Court.
Many will take the view that a constitutional amendment is nec-
essary to accomplish this reform."9 However, the language of the
Constitution does not specify life tenure. It provides: "The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour . "..."20 The language states the
basis for removal from office, not any particular length of term.
Justices are subject to removal only by impeachment because they
are "civil officers" within the meaning of the Impeachment Clause
of Article II, Section 4. Other civil officers who are subject to ap-
pointment and removal by impeachment and whose terms are not
specified in the Constitution do not enjoy life tenure. I am not
aware of any Supreme Court decision holding that life tenure is
actually required by Article III for federal judges, although lan-
guage in some decisions might be read as assuming that it is
required.21
Thirty or forty years of tenure is too long a period to allow a
" See, e.g., Philip Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges, 36 U. Cm L.
REv. 665, 697 (1969); Philip D. Oliver, Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amend-
ment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 800 n.9 (1986).
20 U.S. CONST. art. III, § i.
" See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 410 (1989); Palmore v. United States,
411 U.S. 389, 407 (1973); see also Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037,
1039 (7th Cir. 1984).
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small group of individuals to have such a profound effect on the
course of our nation. A regular rotation of Justices will allow our
Senate and President to sketch out policies, approaches, and even
some sensible criteria for selecting members of this important
Court.
Given our tradition or expectation of life tenure for the Jus-
tices, it might be best in any case to provide for limited terms by
amendment rather than by statute. Whatever means is chosen,
however, the matter ought to be addressed if the people and Con-
gress are seriously concerned that life tenure tends to produce un-
due political influence on the Court.
V. THE SENATE SHOULD TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE
The Constitution provides a very active role for the Senate in
nominations. The President "shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint" Justices.22 If the
Senate is to act "with" the President in the process, it needs to
move into the actual examination of potential Justices early,
rather than wait on the sidelines until the President sends a
name." For example, the Senate could create a search committee
from its own ranks to examine potential nominees, then send
these when appropriate to the President for his or her
examination.
The public should be kept regularly informed of the people
whom the Senate Search Committee has on its "short list." Public
information will allow people to bring forth genuine, positive
qualities of potential nominees, as well as point out potential ob-
jections. As it now stands, the nomination process focuses too
much on the "negatives." The creation of such a pool would help
Senators develop guidelines for selection. Also, more qualified
people would realize that it is possible to become a Justice, and
might be inspired to develop a sound foundation and "go for
it." '24 The nomination process seems to be a search for some de-
22 US. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
23 My friend and Santa Clara colleague, Professor Russell Galloway, had begun a project
to bring about this kind of consideration.
24 My wife, Susan Anawalt, provided the ideas that the pool will help establish guidelines
and the rotation will inspire people to "go for it."
Vol. 7: 49, 1991
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fect that will disqualify the candidate. Every person who is likely
to sit on the Court will have some kind of negative aspect. Focus-
ing primarily on negative aspects creates a search for a "safe"
nominee, rather than an excellent one.
A search committee function already exists in the White House
for nominees, and there has been a deep concern that this search
has involved "litmus tests" on such issues as abortion, freedom of
religion, and affirmative action. Bringing this function back to the
Senate would place it exactly where the Constitution appears to
expect it. If "litmus tests" were being used, then the public would
certainly have a better chance to learn about them and object.
The Senate should employ professional investigators to look in-
dependently into factual questions, such as behavior that relates to
the nominee's capacity or qualifications. That way sensitive ques-
tions can be fully examined with attention to human needs of dig-
nity and privacy.25
The actual conduct of the hearings on Supreme Court nomina-
tions can be improved as well. The Senators have made many
statements about their own understanding of the Constitution
during recent hearings. To a certain degree that is necessary, and
it has been helpful in educating our own people about the Consti-
tution. However, the Senators need to learn to ask questions. Too
many of the "questions" themselves were really speeches. The
Senators need to ask some "open" questions and give the nomi-
nees more room to explore and explain. Follow-up questions
should probe sometimes, and at other times they should simply
invite the nominee to move further along a train of thought.2
2' The nomination of Clarence Thomas was marred by the fact that a particularly seri-
ous charge of sexual harassment involving the nominee was inadequately examined by the
Senate panel during its regular hearings. The suggestion of the Senate's establishment of
an independent investigative staff was made by National Public Radio journalist Nina
Totenberg, in a speech to the Santa Clara County Bar Association on January 21, 1991.
28 Some questioning needs to be hard hitting. That was the case in the Clarence
Thomas-Anita Hill set of hearings. The nominee determined that he was not going to give
his version of the alleged events. Nevertheless, any modestly skilled set of questions could
have drawn out aspects related to those events from him. He could have been asked about
his usual methods of conferring with staff, his pattern of work with Professor Hill, and a
whole range of other questions that would have revealed related facts and aspects of his
demeanor in response.
HeinOnline  -- 7 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 59 1991-1992
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 7: 49, 1991
CONCLUSION
We can improve the role of the Supreme Court and the quality
of justice by a more thoughtful assessment of nominees' qualities,
including constitutional philosophy; placing the political role in
proper perspective by being more active through the elective po-
litical processes; paying less attention to the false liberal-conserva-
tive political dichotomy; limiting the terms of Justices; and insti-
tuting the actual constitutional mandate of full senatorial
participation in the appointment process.
We are responsible for the kind of society we live in. After all,
we construct it. That is the most fundamental lesson of our consti-
tutional experience. We are choosing justice when we select the
Justices. Now, it is essential that we turn our attention to dramati-
cally improving that aspect of our democracy.
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